Op-Ed Piece by LtCol Allen B West (US Army. Ret)

Op-Ed Piece


Afghanistan Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel Allen B West (US Army, Ret)

10 November 2009

“To know your enemy, know yourself, and know the terrain, in countless battles you will be victorious”.
Art of War, Sun Tzu

On Saturday, 31 October I attended the farewell services for a fallen Comrade, Army Specialist Daniel Courtney Lawson a Son, Husband, and Father of three. SPC Lawson’s life was cut short due to an improvised explosive device (IED) in the Arghandab Valley, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.  It just happens that is an area of which I am quite familiar because of a 2 ½ year assignment I spent based out of Kandahar as an advisor to the Afghan National Army from June 2005-November 2007.

As I drove back down I-95 from Daniel’s final resting place I pondered, “How do we defeat this enemy”? My immediate answer went to Sun Tzu’s prescient strategic maxim.

First we must understand the enemy against whom we are engaged in truly a global conflagration. We continue to think of Afghanistan as a “war” within itself, which it is not. Afghanistan is a theater of operations within a greater engagement, War, against radical Islamic totalitarianism and state sponsored terrorism.

It is a War which extends to every area of the world, and right here in our America. We have to stop trying to define this enemy in comfortable, politically correct definitions. It is not just about Taliban or Al Qaeda, should they change their name can we declare victory?

When we clearly understand the enemy and their strategic perspective we can then delineate the goals and objectives to defeat them.

It requires the leaders of this Country to study and understand Islamic culture and recognize that no Islamic Republic can be “democratized”. The Koran does not support recognition of secular government, only the supposed word of Allah as a means of governance. We must understand what Sharia Law is and what does it promote.

What has been our major failure?

We have gone away from, what we call in military lexicon, being oriented on the enemy to a terrain orientation. This has resulted in “nation building” which dilutes your focus and drains your resources. Having been in both theaters of operation, Iraq and Afghanistan, I absolutely detest the words, “winning hearts and minds”. That is an extremely nebulous goal which can change in meaning from one day to the next in a counter-insurgent operation. 
Furthermore, you must realize that in the culture that is Iraq, Afghanistan, and indeed the Islamic world, strength is respected, regarded, and yes, feared. Offerings of goodwill are often associated with weakness and truly disregarded.

Now, there are those who are saying “typical dumb military talk”, no, I am saying that before schools can be built, clinics established, and governing institutions advocated there must be security. My experiences have been that during the day we enter a village or area and offer assistance, funding, infrastructure support. However, at night the enemy enters and threatens leaders.

Therefore, here are the goals and objectives I offer as a strategy for Afghanistan:

1. Deny the enemy sanctuary; become enemy oriented and get out into the areas and reduce the bases of operation of the enemy. This also means separating him from resources he needs to survive. In Vietnam we did that with the “Strategic Hamlet” program and when we pulled back into large bases we surrendered the countryside to the Vietcong. In Iraq we went into the areas and proved to the tribal leaders, Sheiks that we would fight and stay.

2. Interdict the flow of supplies, manpower, materiel, and financial resources; no enemy can survive without resources. We must recognize that the opium production is a key part of the resourcing of this enemy. The local farmer does not care who buys the product, he just wants to survive. Separate the enemy from this resource, however destroying the crop only forces the farmer to the enemy.

3. Influence the populace; this relates to winning the Information War which we are losing. The enemy is getting their propaganda out far better than we are. In Afghanistan you have a huge illiteracy issue, over 70%. However, they listen to the radio like crazy. We don’t we establish radio stations on the secured bases and broadcast across the Country against the radical terrorist enemy. Get our message out so that we stop losing to their deliberate jihadist message.

4. Cordon off the Theaters of Operation; we have to understand that the surrounding countries have an effect. In 2006 the decision to pull the Pakistan Army out of the NW Federated Tribal Areas, North and South Waziristan, resulted in the creation of a huge enemy sanctuary. We need to create a security zone that extends beyond our operating areas; the same applies to Iraq as well.

In concert with these strategic/operational objectives we must do several other things:

1. Revise our Rules of Engagement (ROE); about two months ago a remote Army outpost became engaged in a horrific attack. The enemy staged from a local mosque, which is on a protected list. It took 21 minutes for close air support (CAS) to come on station because of the stringent ROE on precluding civilian casualties. The enemy knows the game, the rules have to change to support our troops in contact.

2. Institute a “Strike Operation” tactic; we must use our greatest asset, operational maneuverability to strike the enemy wherever he presents himself. We must regain the initiative, especially now as he seeks to “go to ground” for the winter. The tactical focus has to be on finding the enemy, fixing him in place denying his movement, engaging him with all available weapon systems, destroying him, and pursuing him. It has to be about maintaining pressure.

3. Breakdown the large operations bases; having been on Kandahar Airfield and Bagram I have seen the burgeoning “military cities” we have created. This results in an excessive need for resources and internal security that could be focused elsewhere.

4. Encourage our NATO allies; if it still remains in Kabul there was the renowned “book of caveats” which specified what NATO contributing forces could and could not do in support of the mission. I recall such heinous restrictions such as not being able to conduct night operations, not being able to leave the roads to fight the enemy, and not being allowed to participate in any combat operations, unless attacked.

No, I am not a nation-building advocate. The future of countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan has to be determined by them. I do support our setting the conditions, security, in order for them to truly choose the best course of action for their Nation.

Our leaders must articulate their strategic goals and match the right resources to their accomplishment. That has been severely missing over the past 16+ years. We must leverage every technological advantage we have in order to defeat this enemy.

Most importantly, we must have civilian leadership with a will, conviction, and a commitment to Victory.

Lieutenant Colonel Allen B West (USA, Ret) is a 22 year active duty veteran. He holds a Bachelors degree from University of Tennessee and a Masters degree from Kansas State University both in Political Science and a Masters of Military Arts and Science from the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College in Political theory and Military Operations. LTC(R) West is the Republican party candidate for US Congressional district 22.